This article considers the relationship between transnationalism and social capital amongst young Pakistani Muslim women in Bradford. Due to their parents' experience of migration and community-building, and unprecedented advances in modern telecommunications and media, the transnational is omnipresent in the everyday lives of second-generation migrants. We illustrate how they accrue faithbased social capital to negotiate and resist transnationally gendered expectations, norms, values and practices. In particular, in several ways they use faith-based social capital that is transnationally informed: to challenge the patriarchal expectations and norms of their families; to gain access to higher/further education and thereby improve their life opportunities; and to overcome growing anti-Muslim sentiment.
Introduction
In January 2016, the UK Conservative government announced a new initiative for Muslim women to learn English, so they would become a moderating force and act as vocal opponents of radical Imams in their community. The initiative was seen as a response to concern amongst politicians and policy-makers that young Muslim men become radicalised because of 'the traditional submissiveness of Muslim women', as it would be incorrect to assume that all women have access to the same kind of social capital, as it is likely to be influenced by the intersectional axes of class, generation, race/ethnicity and religion.
A largely US-based literature explores how various ethnic groups mobilise collective resources (family, kinship and community) to overcome particular disadvantages (e.g. Portes and Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1992) . Bankston and Zhou (2002: 286) examine 'ethnicity as a resource' and define social capital 'to not only include the resources held by individuals or groups but also as "processes" of social interaction leading to constructive outcomes'. 3 The relationship between families and the community (local and transnational) is understood to be cyclical. The community is an important vehicle for reinforcing various norms, beliefs and values (e.g. education and hard work) transmitted by the family, and vice versa.
Others have examined the role of religion or faith-based social capital, particularly in terms of how it can accrue physical resources and social networks (Furbey et al., 2006; Smidt, 2003) . Religious-based social capital has also been viewed suspiciously. Hopkins (2011: 530) warns that '[a] n unfortunate impediment to analysing faith identities and how they contribute to the production of social capital is a tendency to regard religion as irrational and as therefore inherently problematic' -especially
Islam and Muslims.
Social capital has also been used to explore contemporary processes of transnationalism, for example the emergence of transnational families that have been understood discursively, such as in a sense of de-territorialised solidarity between a group of strangers of 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983) , or materially, whereby goods, funds and opportunities flow in and through transnational circuits (Kivisto, 2001) . Contrary to the argument that mobility will deplete conventional stocks of social capital (Coleman, 1988) , new forms of social capital are reestablished (Ballard, 2003; Goulbourne, 2002; Portes et al., 1999; Vertovec, 2001 ).
Resources are mobilised through social networks to facilitate and sustain family relationships across national borders (Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Goulbourne and Chamberlain, 2001; Portes et al., 1999; Zontini, 2010) . Social capital is pivotal in the decision to migrate, to facilitate settlement and the acquisition of information and resources in the new country, and can be readily mobilised within transnational family networks in times of need, for instance economic hardship (Ballard, 2003; VoigtGraf, 2004) . Whilst immigrants are not tied to localised communities, kin and ethnic ties bound up in notions of trust, reciprocity and solidarity continue to play a central role in processes of migration and settlement. Landolt (2001: 217) describes how norms and practices come to exist through 'circuits of transnational obligations and interests'. 4 Often transnational marriage plays a key role in the processes described by Landolt (2001) and Vertovec (2004) , especially in extending a family's kinship network and collective upward mobility. when, for the first time, the protagonists were predominantly young Pakistani Muslim men (Burlet and Reid, 1998; Macey, 2002 Macey, , 1999 . Young women, for the most part,
were not directly involved in these disturbances.
We draw 
Young Women -Change and Resistance
The young women in our research talked about how the migratory and transnational experiences and practices of their parents informed their relationships with them, with their family in Pakistan, and with the larger society. 5 Parents often relied upon narratives of their 'loss', 'sacrifice' and 'hardship' when they arrived in the UK in 5 According to Yeoh et al. (2005: 308) : "[t]he transnational family as a formation derives its lived reality not only from material bonds of collective welfare among physically dispersed members but also a shared imaginary of 'belonging', which transcends particular periods and places to encompass past trajectories and future continuities."
order to instil particular norms and values in young people (e.g. the need to respect their elders, and arranged marriage to first cousins). This explained how and why gendered expectations were often reproduced inter-generationally. Young women were expected to take on the traditional role as a dutiful wife, daughter-in-law and mother. Family honour (izzat), which is closely tied to patrilineal decent group (biraderi), remained a central tenet of transnational families. Young women, in particular, were expected to respect and adhere to it. Failure to do so often resulted in being shunned by the family and community, forced into an arranged marriage or, in some extreme cases, subjected to violence and even murder (i.e. honour-basedviolence) (Werbner, 2007; Meetoo and Mirza, 2007) . 6 Our research found that young women demonstrated agency via a religious rather than ethnic identity because they saw religion to be more empowering than their culture and cultural identity. Rather than being a source of oppression and exclusion (Hopkins, 2011) , religion for these women was a resource to be mobilised against what Ali (1992: 115) describes as a 'northern conservatism' in northern English cities, where an overbearing Pakistani patriarchal masculine culture suppresses Pakistani women. Unlike some of their male counterparts who were associated with deviant masculinities, the disturbances, 'gang culture', underachievement (e.g. education and economic) (Macey, 1999 (Macey, , 2002 , young women used their faith identity to negotiate, challenge and transform transnational gendered norms and expectations, on the one hand and, on the other, to counter growing anti-Muslim hostility. Indeed, 'religious cultural capital' (Ramji, 2007 (Ramji, : 1181 became an important tool for personal betterment, particularly through education, for many young Muslim women.
The respondents built this religious capital with like-minded women (and men) whom they met at Islamic conferences, book readings, prayer sessions or school/college/university. For many of the young women, such networks and associations constituted a religious community that provided 'safe spaces' where they could share their ideas and learn more about their faith. Indeed, it was an outlet where they could air their frustrations and seek solace. Often such interactions took place at university or college and in Muslim associations. The respondents also arranged
Qur'an reading sessions and social evenings where they would discuss their faith in greater detail. They also discussed more contentious issues such as the media and political demonization of Islam, and how they ought to respond to this as individuals.
Many held the view that they each had a responsibility not to besmirch Islam through their daily interactions with non-Muslims, even in the face of growing hostility.
Transnational linkages were also established via particular chat-rooms on the Internet and/or sharing their ideas about their personal faith journey with Islamic bloggers.
This community was seen to be more progressive and valuable in, for example, emphasising the Islamic perspective about the importance of education as a counter to ignorance. It was both a source of inspiration and support for many of the young women in negotiating and challenging transnational cultural practices whilst bringing about positive change in Bradford. Often, gaining access to higher/further education entailed building relationships of trust with parents. Young women were critical of how their parents still held onto gendered expectations about female education that were no longer relevant in Pakistan. Indeed, there was a sense that their parents were out of touch with the changes that had taken place in Pakistan and they were holding onto an image that no longer existed. They were also critical of how their parents' judgement was always informed by worst-case scenarios (e.g. that the daughter would elope or be enticed 12 into Western ways such as drinking and smoking, and bring shame and dishonour to the family). Indeed, whilst many parents appreciated the importance of education, they often opposed the values that education promoted, such as individuality, freedom, and greater autonomy. A number of female respondents spoke anecdotally about female friends being removed by their parents from compulsory education just before they were about to sit for their final exams and taken back to Pakistan to be married. In some instances, this went against the key goal of transnational family strategy to enhance 'social, cultural and symbolic capital' through education (Waters, 2005; Yeoh et al., 2005: 312) .
One way in which some of the women sought to build this trust was by demonstrating and performing their religion more obviously, for example wearing the hijab (headscarf), which then counterpoised them with their supposedly less religious, nonhijab wearing female counterparts, who were looked upon with greater suspicion by parents when out in public away from the scrutiny of their family. Similarly, Ali (1992: 114) comments that 'the good Muslim girl who shows unusual devotion to her faith may find it possible to express a desire for higher education or professional employment without risking her position'. Sara, the respondent whom we mentioned earlier, was considered very religious by her parents because she wore the hijab, prayed five times a day and was planning a pilgrimage to Mecca. In discussing how cultural practices within the community can be barriers to women's educational aspirations, Sara said: Faith-based social capital also served another purpose. In the face of growing antiMuslim sentiment, the young women relied on their faith-based networks for support.
The fear of anti-Muslim reprisals after 9/11 had deep reverberations within Muslim communities. For instance, Nabila (aged 17) talked about the growing hostility towards Muslims since 9/11 and her frustration in challenging it:
It's giving them [Muslims] 14 Despite these concerns, many young women decided to keep wearing the hijab.
Indeed, the strength and resilience to continue wearing the hijab came from the women who were also wearing one. Whilst young women are expected to adhere to transnational patriarchal expectations, values and practices, women resist by developing coping strategies that centre on faith-based social capital -faith is a resource. They understand 'being Muslim' as a source of strength, solace, and security in terms of negotiating (albeit subtly), on the one hand, relations and structures of power within their own communities and, on the other hand, increasing discrimination and hostility externally.
Conclusion
Overall, we illustrate how unequal gendered power relations do not undermine the capacity to build social capital − including faith-based capital. Instead, we have argued that faith based capital is mobilized by women to: negotiate both the public and the private; advance educationally; and challenge the misconceptions of the
